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Abstract
In many countries, Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) establishes less strict dismissal
procedures for specific groups of workers. This paper builds a simple matching model with hetero-
geneous workers in order to analyze this feature of EPL. We use the model to analyze the effects
of reforms targeted at lowering the firing costs of a particular group of workers, and compare the
results with those stemming from a comprehensive reform that reduces firing costs for all workers.
The model is calibrated for the Spanish economy, where an important reform of this kind took
place in 1997. Overall, our results point out that EPL reforms achieve the largest reduction in
unemployment when they are targeted to workers with lower and more volatile productivity.
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1.   Introduction 
 
In many countries, Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) gives differential 
treatment to different groups of workers. In particular, dismissal procedures may 
vary depending on age, skill, unemployment duration, etc, providing a wedge in 
firing costs across workers. This is, for instance,  the case of a series of EPL 
reforms in Europe and Latin America since the 1980s where firms have been 
restricted in their use of “flexible contracts” (part-time, fixed-term, seasonal, new 
jobs contracts) to hire exclusively workers in some population groups, while 
prime-age workers are not eligible for these contracts.1 
While there may be good political economy reasons for reforming the 
labor market through two-tier schemes in order to avoid workers´ resistance to 
reforms (see e.g., Saint-Paul, 1996, 2000), the analysis of the economic 
consequences of allowing for targeted EPL regulations have received less 
attention. In effect, to the best of our knowledge, most papers dealing with the 
effects of EPL reforms on labor market outcomes have concentrated on 
comprehensive reforms, overlooking the fact that EPL may be targeted. This 
focus would be correct if the targeted reforms only affected the targeted groups. 
However, they would miss an important element in the analysis if this type of 
reform gives rise to spillover effects on non-targeted workers.  
To fill this gap in the literature, we build a simple model where two groups 
of workers with different productivity levels interact through the matching 
process in a labor market subject to search frictions. We use the model to compare 
the effects of a targeted reduction of firing costs concerning only one group of 
workers with the effects of a comprehensive reform that reduces the firing costs 
for all workers. In order to stress the beneficial effects of EPL reforms, we assume 
throughout the analysis that firing costs imply a pure waste of resources like e.g., 
those stemming from judicial red-tape costs in the process of dismissals (see 
Burda, 1992). In a more general model in which severance payments could 
provide some insurance to workers or enhance productivity, the losses originating 
from their reduction ought to be weighed against the gains obtained under our 
restrictive assumption. Yet, the spillover effects analyzed here are likely to remain 
the same. 
Our model draws on the seminal work of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) 
about the determinants of equilibrium unemployment in labor markets with search 
frictions. In particular, our contribution falls into the “search and matching” 
                                                 
1 See Booth, Dolado and Frank (2002) for an overview of targeted EPL reforms in Europe. An 
illustrative example of this type of reform is the recent (failed) attempt by the French government 
to introduce first job contracts for young workers up to age 26. This reform would allow 
employers to shed young workers without justification during the first two years of their contract, 
though with notice and subject to a small compensation.  
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literature that examines the effects of comprehensive changes in firing costs (e.g. 
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, and Ljungqvist, 2002, Garibaldi and Violante, 
2005) and, more specifically, the effects of EPL reforms in dual labor markets 
(e.g., Wasmer, 1999 Blanchard and Landier, 2002, Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 
2002).2 This last stream of the literature has analyzed the consequences of the 
unrestricted option to convert fixed-term into permanent contracts for 
unemployment and job turnover3. Therefore, the spillover effects of targeted EPL 
have been generally ignored.4  
In principle, there are two ways in which these interaction effects may 
arise. First, they can operate through technological complementarities, whereby 
employment changes of the targeted workers may affect productivity and 
employment of non-targeted workers in different markets. Accordingly, the 
outcome of differentiated EPL depends crucially upon the elasticity of 
substitution among workers. Since this is a well-documented effect, we will not 
tackle it here (see, e.g., Cardullo and Van der Linden, 2006). Secondly, changes in 
the overall labor market tightness following targeted EPL reforms affect the exit 
rate out of unemployment of all workers as long as the labor markets are not 
completely segmented by population groups. Further, inasmuch as these 
variations in labor market tightness affect workers’ reservation wages, we may 
also expect to have changes in firms’ hiring and firing decisions as a result of 
these reforms.5 These are the key channels we explore in the sequel.  
To do so, we require a model with two main ingredients: (I) heterogeneous 
workers and (possibly) jobs, albeit with incomplete segmentation of labor 
markets; and (II) endogenous job creation and job destruction decisions by firms. 
In general, the combination of these two ingredients makes the model highly un-
tractable, as reflected by the lack of studies that analyze models with 
                                                 
2 These studies find that a reduction of firing costs in entry-level jobs stimulates hiring. However, 
employers also become more reluctant to convert these entry-level jobs into permanent 
employment contracts. This feature leads to more workers´ turnover and, if the severance pay gap 
is sufficiently large, to more unemployment. 
3 Belot, Boone and van Ours (2002) also analyze the trade-off between productivity and flexibility. 
This trade-off may influence the firm’s decision to convert a temporary job into a permanent one 
when job stability is productivity-enhancing. 
4 Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and Nunziata and Staffolani (2001) analyze the role of 
restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts by imposing a maximum value for the proportion of 
fixed-term employees that firms can hire. Note, however, that this restriction does not capture the 
targeted nature of “employment promotion” contracts.    
5 A third possibility is that firms decide to rank eligible applicants ahead of non-eligible ones, even 
though the latter are more productive. This direct substitution effect is absent in our model. 
Nonetheless, the changes in the hiring strategies of firms do allow for indirect substitution effects 
as a larger proportion of the matches of eligible workers will result in a match. 
2
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Topics), Art. 14
http://www.bepress.com/bejm/vol7/iss1/art14
heterogeneous agents and endogenous hiring and firing.6 Hence, in order to 
achieve analytical tractability, we adopt the strong, yet useful, assumption of 
complete random matching in the baseline version of the model. Specifically, we 
consider two groups of workers, labeled as high and low-productivity workers, 
respectively, who compete for the same jobs, with initial and subsequent 
productivity levels being drawn from different distributions with overlapping 
supports. Thus, workers differ with respect to their expected productivity, while 
the actual productivity of a low-productivity worker may exceed that of some of 
the high-productivity workers. Moreover, the model allows for differences in the 
arrival rate of shocks across the two types of workers. In equilibrium, firms will 
therefore use different hiring and firing rules for each group of workers and our 
aim is to establish how these rules are affected by different types of EPL reforms 
in a setup where spillover effects are amplified. Finally, in order to analyze the 
consequences of this assumption, a comparison between the outcomes of the 
baseline model and those obtained from a model where markets are completely 
segmented (i.e., directed search) is also performed as a way to derive an upper 
bound for the magnitude of the spillover effects.  
To obtain reasonable predictions, we calibrate our model to the Spanish 
labor market in the late 1990s, since Spain has been traditionally considered as a 
prototypical case study regarding asymmetric EPL. In particular, we focus on a 
reform approved in 1997 where a new type of permanent contract (with 
substantially lower firing costs) was introduced for specific groups of workers 
(see Section 2). Our results provide an economic rationale for this choice by 
predicting that EPL reforms achieve the largest reduction in unemployment are 
those  targeted to workers with relatively low and volatile levels of productivity, 
like in the case of that reform. Finally, the model predicts that, although the 
absolute size of the spillover effects is relatively small (slightly less than 1 p.p. in 
an economy with an unemployment rate of 20% before the reform), they become 
more sizeable in relative terms (explaining about 20% of the fall in the aggregate 
unemployment rate resulting from the targeted EPL reform). These figures, 
however, ought to be interpreted as upper bounds on the true effects. 
   The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 motivates the 
analysis by both describing some salient features of targeted EPL regulations in 
several countries and presenting a brief overview of the main findings in the 
empirical literature about the effects of targeted EPL, which hints at the existence 
of spillover effects. This leads us to the empirical counterparts of the main 
ingredients of the model that we use for calibration. Section 3 lays out the model, 
while Section 4 contains the positive analysis of the effects of firing costs in labor 
                                                 
6 For example, the well-known studies by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999) and Garibaldi 
and Violante (2005) assume full segmentation by skills into sub-markets.  
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markets with heterogeneous workers competing for identical jobs. More 
concretely, we compare the effects of three alternative EPL policies: i) a targeted 
reduction of firing costs for the low-productivity workers, ii) a targeted reduction 
of firings costs for the high-productivity workers, and iii) a comprehensive 
reduction of firing costs for all workers. Finally, Section 6 contains some 
concluding remarks. Appendix A presents proofs for some comparative statics 
results of the model, whereas Appendix B offers the detailed results of the 
calibration exercise in the case where markets are assumed to be completely 
segmented.  
 
2.   Targeted EPL: Institutional details and some empirical 
evidence 
 
2.1 Institutional details 
 
It is a well-known fact that EPL varies significantly across countries. However, 
much less attention has been devoted to the fact that EPL also varies within 
countries depending on firms’ and worker’s characteristics - such as firm size, 
existence of collective agreement, tenure, skill, educational level, etc.7 In this 
regard, there are two sources of variation in the enforcement of EPL. First, 
procedural requirements for dismissals, advanced notice/severance pay 
provisions, and prevailing standards of penalties for unfair dismissals are usually 
stricter for prime-age and older workers. For instance, EPL provisions are less 
strict for blue-collar workers in some European countries like Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Greece and Italy.  With the exception of France, the required 
notice period is shorter for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers. 
Typically, severance pay for individual/ unjustified dismissals is similar for both 
types of workers, except in Belgium, Denmark and Greece, where the former are 
entitled to lower indemnities.8 
Secondly, prime-age, adult workers are not always entitled to be hired 
under “atypical” employment contracts involving less strict EPL provisions. The 
                                                 
7 OECD (1994, Annex 2.A) presents a detailed and comprehensive description of EPL in several 
countries and its variation by worker skills, tenure, the existence of collective agreements, and 
firm size. For a justification and the implications of variable enforcement of EPL by firm size, see 
Boeri and Jimeno (2005). 
8 The information in the text refers to the end of the 1990s and focuses on the differential dismissal 
procedures for specific groups. Other aspects such as the dependence of EPL on tenure or age are 
nor captured by our model and are therefore not discussed in detail. Strictly speaking, as will 
become clearer in the calibration exercises, the structure of our model most carefully reflects 
targeted EPL when there are no transitions across groups, like e.g. gender or skill/educational 
differences that cannot be overcome. As we argue below, some of these characteristics hold for the 
groups affected by targeted EPL in Spain, which is the economy we try to calibrate in section 4.    
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country where this type of contracts is more prevalent is Spain.9 Since the mid-
1980s, when temporary employment contracts were liberalized, the proportion of 
temporary employees in total (salaried) employment is about 33%. Several 
reforms in the 1990s aimed at reducing temporary employment, by further 
differentiating firing costs. The most important one took place in 1997, when a 
new permanent contract was introduced entailing lower firing costs than the 
standard permanent contracts in case of “unfair” dismissals”. However, the 
eligible groups were limited to young workers (aged 18-29), long-term 
unemployed registered at the public employment office for at least twelve months, 
unemployed above 45 years of age, disabled people and workers whose contracts 
were transformed from temporary into permanent ones. Conversely, prime-aged 
workers in the age bracket 30-45 with unemployment spells shorter than a year 
were excluded.10 Yet, Spain is not the only European country that has liberalized 
atypical employment contracts or reduced firing costs contingent on some 
workers’ characteristics. In 1984, Italy also introduced “employment promotion 
contracts” (Contratti di Formazione e Lavoro) aimed at the hiring and firm-based 
training of young workers (between 15 and 29 years of age). Likewise, fixed-term 
contracts were first introduced in France in 1979 but their scope was very much 
reduced by the socialist government in 1982. After a reform in 1990, these 
contracts can only be used for seasonal activities, replacements of employees on 
leave, temporary increases in activity and for facilitating employment for targeted 
groups, ranging from the young to the long-term unemployed workers (see 
Blanchard and Landier, 2002).  More recently (see footnote 1), there was the 
proposal to introduce a new jobs contract under which employers may fire at will 
workers under 26 employed for less than two years, paying those fired 8% of their 
salary to date, with a further 2% payment to organizations that help job-seekers. 
However, this reform was withdrawn. 
In Latin America as well there have been targeted EPL reforms, some 
aimed at  decreasing firing costs (Colombia and Peru at the end of the 1980s) and 
others at increasing them (Brazil, Venezuela, Chile, the Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua, and Panama)11. However, the only country which significantly 
liberalized the use of atypical contracts targeted at some demographic groups was 
Argentina, where a reform in 1991 introduced both fixed-term and training 
                                                 
9 See Dolado, García-Serrano and Jimeno (2002) for a detailed description of reforms leading to 
the surge of temporary employment in Spain. 
10 Besides the economic and political motives for a partial reform, the restrictions on the use of 
these contracts also have a legal basis. Namely, the Spanish law does not allow two identical 
workers to hold open-ended contracts that are identical except for their severance payments. This 
feature obliged the government to restrict the use of the newly created contracts to the above-
mentioned groups for which it was legal to provide less stringent EPL. 
11 See IDB (2003), chapter 7. 
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contracts for young workers, while a new reform in 1995 introduced other types 
of flexible contracts to promote employment of certain population groups.  
Thus, this myriad of EPL provisions introduce differentiated firing costs 
along several dimensions (age, gender, skill, education, unemployment duration, 
etc.). Typically, the result is that, in those countries with more prevalence of 
“atypical” employment contracts, EPL entails lower firing costs for low-skilled, 
low-educated workers in low-productivity jobs. Rather than focusing in each of 
the dimensions along which firing costs may differ, we take this observation as 
the main guide for our model of differentiated firing costs and only distinguish 
between high-productivity and low-productivity workers, regardless of the 
sources of the productivity differentials across workers. 
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence on targeted EPL reforms 
 
Regarding the existence of spillover effects of targeted reductions of firing costs, 
we rely on the empirical literature on the unemployment consequences of labor 
market institutions. This literature has followed two routes. First, there are cross-
country studies that use quantitative or qualitative indicators for the stringency of 
EPL to explain international differences in labor market outcomes, such as 
employment and unemployment rates (see, e.g., Nickell and Layard, 1999). 
Within this literature, a large number of recent studies have looked at the 
interactions between institutions and shocks, and to the different impact of 
institutions on the labor market outcomes of different population groups, such as 
youths and females.12 Nonetheless, in most studies, targeted employment policies 
or partial labor market reforms are considered, if anything, in the construction of 
the overall institutional indexes regarding EPL strength, but not separately as an 
institutional feature on its own. This approach can be fairly restrictive since, as 
shown below, a general reduction of firing costs does not have the same effects as 
a commensurate reduction in the firing costs of a certain group of workers. 
Nonetheless, despite the fact that the empirical evidence on this type of reform is 
not totally conclusive, in general there is some support for the existence of 
spillover effects. Among the studies that estimate the labor market impact of 
targeted employment policies (e.g., those based on temporary contracts) 
separately from aggregate indexes of EPL, Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela 
(2002) find that, while a less strict regulation of fixed-term employment contracts 
tends to reduce the youth unemployment rate, it also leads to a small rise in the 
prime-age male unemployment rate. Likewise, using an unbalanced panel of nine 
                                                 
12 On interactions, see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). On the different impact of labor market 
institutions across population groups, see Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2003), Jimeno and Rodriguez-
Palenzuela (2002), and Neumark and Wascher (2003). On the impact of employment protection 
legislation on employment adjustment, see Caballero, Engel and Micco (2003). 
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OECD countries during the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s, Nunziata and 
Staffolani (2001) also estimate the effects of targeted EPL by distinguishing three 
types of regulations: EPL regarding dismissals of permanent employees, 
regulations regarding fixed-term employees, and temporary work agencies 
(TWAs) regulations. Their findings are similar to those discussed before: less 
stringent regulations had a significant positive impact on total employment of 
young workers while some spillover effects on other groups of workers are 
documented.  
The second stream of the empirical literature looks at specific country 
episodes of targeted reforms by analyzing labor market outcomes before and after 
the reform, along the lines of the “differences-in-differences” evaluation 
approach. In the Spanish case, Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2003) find that the 
reduction of firing costs (and payroll taxes) in 1997 for young, older  and long-
term unemployed workers had a positive effect on hiring for young workers, with 
little effect on dismissals, while it increased both dismissals and hiring for older 
men. Blanchard and Landier (2002), looking at transitions between temporary and 
permanent employment in France, observe larger turnover since 1983, especially 
for the younger cohorts of workers whose probability of holding a fixed-term job 
increased significantly after the reform. Yet, they also document a somewhat 
larger turnover for prime-age workers as a consequence of cross-effects.  Finally, 
Hopenhayn (2001) also finds that the introduction of fixed-term contracts in 
Argentina had a very strong impact on labor turnover, inducing an increase in the 
hiring rate of young/unskilled workers, but also detects some strong substitution 
of permanent jobs by temporary jobs. 
 
3.   The model  
 
Our model draws on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999) with two extensions. 
First, we allow for heterogeneity in workers’ productivity. Secondly, we assume 
that the initial productivity of jobs is random. The first extension gets at how 
reforms aimed at easing layoffs of one type of workers affects unemployment, 
productivity and wages of all workers. The second extension allows for a more 
detailed analysis of how the hiring of different types of workers depends crucially 
on the structure of firing costs. These costs, as mentioned earlier, are modeled as 
pure waste (not as a transfer to the worker) and, hence, do not play any efficiency 
role. 
The model is in continuous time and only steady states are considered. The 
economy is populated by a continuum of workers of measure one. Workers are 
risk neutral, infinitely-lived, and are of two types, depending on their productivity 
(low, L, and high, H). To simplify the analysis, we assume that there are no 
transitions across workers ´s groups. The type of the worker is revealed to the 
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firm when the two agents meet, so that workers do not have to signal their 
productivity characteristics.13 Firms also know the arrival rate of productivity 
shocks and the distributions from which productivity is drawn for each worker’s 
type. The mass of workers of L-type workers is α. The income obtained while 
unemployed is zi (i=L,H). which is interpreted here as home production or leisure 
and, thus, does not need to be financed. 
The number of firms is endogenously determined. Each firm offers one 
job. The flow cost of keeping a job vacancy unfilled is c. Vacancies are created 
until the exhaustion of any rents from their creation. When a worker and a firm 
with a job vacancy meet, they realize the value of the match. The productivity of 
the match is a random draw from a c.d.f. Fi(ε) with  support [0, ∞), (i=L,H), such 
that FL(ε)>FH(ε) for all ε. Thus, the distribution of productivity of H-type workers 
stochastically dominates the distribution of productivity of L-type workers.  
Wages are determined by Nash bargaining and can be renegotiated 
continuously.  
Job termination is endogenous. There are i.i.d. productivity shocks with 
Poisson arrival rates λi (i=L,H). To terminate the job, firms must pay pure-waste 
dismissal costs Ki (i=L,H). Further, we assume that all separations involve 
dismissal costs. By allowing for different termination costs we aim at capturing 
the targeted nature of EPL discussed at length in the previous sections. Our 
insight is that there are direct (first-round) and indirect (second-round) effects of 
reducing firing costs for just one group of workers, say L-type workers. The direct 
effects stem from the fact that the productivity threshold at which L-type workers 
are dismissed (hired) is higher (lower) the lower KL is. The indirect effects, in 
turn, arise through the determination of the value of jobs filled by H-type workers 
which also changes when KL is reduced. 
 
Matching, hiring, and firing 
 
Job vacancies and unemployed workers meet according to a conventional CRS 
meetings function ( , )m v u , where v and u denote, respectively, the masses of job 
vacancies and of unemployed workers. The meetings function is increasing in 
both arguments and homogeneous of degree one. Labor market tightness is 
denoted by θ= v//u. Given this  function, firms meet with L-type and H-type 
workers with probabilities δq(θ) and  (1-δ)q(θ), respectively, where δ is the 
proportion of unemployed workers of type L and q(θ)=m(1,1/θ), such that 
q’(θ)<0. The matching rate of all workers is θq(θ),with q(θ)+θq’(θ)>0. 
                                                 
13 One possibility is that workers’ productivity is positively correlated with educational level and 
firms receive workers’ CVs or any other certificate displaying their skill level.  
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After the match-specific productivity parameter is revealed, employers face a 
hiring decision. Since the surplus of the match is increasing in productivity, there 
are two productivity thresholds ( ,  h hL Hε ε ), one for each class of workers, above 
which hiring takes place. Conversely, employers terminate a match if the 
productivity of the job falls below the firing thresholds ( ,d dL Hε ε ). 
 
Flows 
 
Given the meetings probabilities and the hiring and firing rules, the flow 
equations are given by: 
 
 [(1 ( )] ( ) ( )L h L dL L L LF q u F eε θ θ δ λ ε− = ,  (1) 
 
 [1 ( )] ( )(1 ) ( )H h H dH H H HF q u F eε θ θ δ λ ε− − = , (2) 
 
where eL and eH are the masses of employed L and H-type workers, respectively. 
The left-hand-sides of (1) and (2)  give the outflows from unemployment while 
the right-hand-sides give the inflows into unemployment (i.e., outflows from 
employment) for L and H-type workers, respectively.  
Since δu + eL = α and (1-δ)u +eH = 1-α, the steady state unemployment 
rates of both types of workers (denoted by ur ) are given by: 
 
 ( )
[(1 ( )] ( ) ( )
L d
L L
L L h L d
L L L
u Fur
F q F
δ λ ε
α ε θ θ λ ε= = − + ,    (1’) 
 
 (1 ) ( )
1 [1 ( )] ( ) ( )
H d
H H
H H h H d
H H H
u Fur
F q F
δ λ ε
α ε θ θ λ ε
−= =− − + .  (2’) 
 
Bellman equations  
 
Let Ui and Wi(ε) denote, respectively, the value of unemployment and the value of 
employment with productivity ε, for workers of type i (=L,H). Then, the 
corresponding Bellman equations are as follows: 
 
( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−+= ∫
∞
0),x(dFU)x(Wmax)(qzrU iiiii
h
iε
θθ                                           (3)  
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[ ] ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−+−+= ∫
∞
0),x(dF)(W)x(Wmax)(WU)(F)(w)(rW iiiiiidiiiii
d
iε
ελεελεε  (4)  
where r is the real interest rate, z is the flow utility while unemployed, and w is 
the wage. Notice that, since there is continuous renegotiation, wages depend on 
productivity and change instantly every time a productivity shock occurs (see the 
discussion on wage determination below).  
 As regards the employers, the value functions of an unfilled vacancy (V) 
and the value functions of filled vacancies with worker of type i (Ji) are given by 
the following Bellman equations:  
 
( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−−+
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−+−= ∫∫
∞∞
0),x(dFV)x(Jmax)(q)1(0),x(dFV)x(Jmax)(qcrV HHLL
h
H
h
L εε
θδθδ  (5) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ( )] ( )
d
i
i d i
i i i i i i i i irJ w F V J K J x J dF x
ε
ε ε ε λ ε ε λ ε
∞
= − + − − + −∫  (6)  
 
Wage determination 
 
As shown by Ljungqvist (2002), the way wage determination is modeled is 
crucial for the analysis of the employment effects of firing costs. On the one hand, 
when firing costs are assumed to reduce the firm’s threat point in the initial 
match, they have a significant impact on hiring and tend to increase equilibrium 
unemployment. On the other, when the worker’s relative share of match surplus is 
assumed to remain invariant as the severance pay changes, they tend to increase 
employment. Here we choose the first modeling strategy route. In particular, we 
assume that: i) wages are determined by symmetric Nash bargaining, so that the 
bargaining power for each party is equal to 0.5, ii) workers cannot post a bond 
and iii) renegotiation takes place as soon as the vacancy is filled out. 
Instantaneous renegotiation implies that workers get insider power and extract the 
rents from firing costs since the beginning of the match. In other words, the 
possibility of undoing the detrimental effect of firing costs on firm’s profits by the 
worker accepting a wage cut from the outset of the match is excluded. Under this 
assumption, the firm’s threat point is the value of the unfilled vacancy net of 
firing costs. Therefore, wages are given by the following condition: 
 
 ( ) ( )i i i iJ V K W Uε ε− + = −  (7) 
 
which, in turn, implies that  
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  [ ])(
2
1)( iii KUrw ++= εε                                 (7’) 
 
 Hence, workers get their bargaining share of productivity, inclusive of the 
return from the value of being unemployed and the corresponding firing costs.  As 
explained before, due to the assumption of instantaneous renegotiation, condition 
(7’) applies both to the initial negotiations with a candidate worker and to 
bargains in continuing relationships that experience a productivity shock.14 
 
Equilibrium 
 
The productivity thresholds at which the hiring process starts to take place are 
those at which the value of a filled vacancy is equal to the value of an unfilled 
vacancy. Since there is free entry, V=0 in the steady-state equilibrium. Likewise, 
jobs are terminated when the value of the job is equal to the value of an unfilled 
vacancy minus termination costs. Thus, 
 
 ( ) 0hi iJ Vε = =  (8) 
 
 ( ) 0di i iJ K Vε + = =          (8’) 
 
Solving the model 
 
The surplus of a job with productivity ε filled by a worker of type i is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )i i i i iS J V K W Uε ε ε= − + + − , where Si´(ε)>0. Since 
 
HLiJUW hii
d
ii ,,0)( and )( === εε , 
 
equations (4) and (6) can be rewritten as follows: 
                                                 
14 In section 4.2, we show that this assumption yields realistic predictions for the effects of the 
1997 targeted reform in Spain. However, as already mentioned, there could be alternative 
specifications of the bargaining process in which the worker extract rents from firing costs in 
continuing matches but not in the first match. Ljungqvist (2002) shows that this kind of a two-tier 
wage system is formally equivalent to assuming that the relative split of the match surplus is 
unaffected by firing costs throughout the employment relationship. This equivalence arises by 
imposing a wage profile under the Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) setup in which new workers 
post a bond equal to their share of any future expected firing costs. A version of the model, where 
the outside option of the firm for newly created jobs is simply V, and not V+K, has also been 
simulated yielding similar qualitative results.  
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 ( )[ ( ) ] ( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ] ( )
d h
i i
i i
i i i i i i i i i ir W U w z W x U dF x q W x U dF x
ε ε
λ ε ε λ θ θ
∞ ∞
+ − = − + − − −∫ ∫   (4’) 
 
( )[ ( ) ] ( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) ( )
d
i
i
i i i i i i i ir J V K w J x V K dF x r V K
ε
λ ε ε ε λ
∞
+ − + = − + − + − −∫ .            (6’) 
 
Hence, adding up those two equations and using (7) yields: 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2d h
i i
i i
i i i i i i i
qr S z S x dF x S x dF x r V K
ε ε
θ θλ ε ε λ
∞ ∞
+ = − + − − −∫ ∫       (9) 
 
Further, noting that 1'( )i
i
S
r
ε λ= + and integrating by parts implies that: 
 
1( ) ( ) [1 ( )] ( ) [1 ( )]          for all i i ii i
i
S x dF x F S F x dx
rε ε
ε ε ελ
∞ ∞
= − + −+∫ ∫  
 
Thus, 
 
( )( ) ( ) [1 ( )] [1 ( )]
2( )
( ) [1 ( )] ( ) ( )
2
d h
i i
i ii
i i i
i i
i
i i
qr S z F x dx F x dx
r r
q F S r V K
ε ε
λ θ θλ ε ε λ λ
θ θ ε ε
∞ ∞
+ = − + − − − −+ +
− − − −
∫ ∫
              (10) 
 
This equation gives the productivity thresholds values for the firms’ hiring and 
firing decisions. Given that 0)( =diiS ε , KS hii 2)( =ε , and V=0 in equilibrium, we 
get: 
 
( )[1 ( )] [1 ( )] ( )[1 ( )]
2( )d h
i i
d i i i hi
i i i i
i i
qz F x dx F x dx q F r K
r rε ε
λ θ θε θ θ ελ λ
∞ ∞
⎡ ⎤= − − + − + − −⎣ ⎦+ +∫ ∫ (11) 
 
( )[1 ( )] [1 ( )] ( )[1 ( )] 2
2( )d h
i i
h i i i hi
i i i i i
i i
qz F x dx F x dx q F r K
r rε ε
λ θ θε θ θ ε λλ λ
∞ ∞
⎡ ⎤= − − + − + − + +⎣ ⎦+ +∫ ∫ (12) 
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so that 2( )h di i i ir Kε ε λ− = + . Equations (11) and (12) give the job destruction and 
job creation rules, respectively. Notice that both rules depend on labor market 
tightness which, in turn, is determined by the job flows implied by the hiring and 
firing rules.  
 
Finally, in equilibrium, the supply of vacancies is determined by the free-
entry condition V=0, which can be written as follows: 
 
1 1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
( ) 2 2
1[1 ( )] [1 ( )]
2( ) 2( )
h h
L H
h h
L H
L H
L L H H
L H
L H
c S x K dF x S x K dF x
q
F x dx F x dx
r r
ε ε
ε ε
δ δθ
δ δ
λ λ
∞ ∞
∞ ∞
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + − − =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
−= − + −+ +
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
            
(13) 
 
To solve the model we must find a vector of variables 
(δ,u,θ,εLh,εLd,εHh,εHd) satisfying equations (1’), (2’), (11), (12) and (13). Note that 
equations (11) and (12) come in pairs, leading to seven equations in seven 
unknowns. However, since the thresholds are related by a simple 
expression, 2( )h di i i ir Kε ε λ− = + , and equations (1’) and (2’) can be combined to 
eliminate the unemployment rate, u, the full system can be easily reduced to four 
equations in four unknowns (δ,θ,εLh,εHh).  
 
4.   Quantitative analysis 
 
In order to obtain tractable analytical results, we assume that the productivity of 
the workers, εi, is exponentially distributed. Thus, 
( ) 1 exp( ),           , ,i i H LF x x i L Hμ μ μ= − − = < . 
 
 Under this assumption, the integrals (which represent the option values of 
future productivity shocks) can be easily solved yielding the following system of 
four equations:  
 
(JHH & JHL) 
[ ]
)exp(
)(
)(2exp
)(2
1)()2( hHH
HH
HHHH
H
HH
HHH
h
H r
KrK
r
qKrz εμλμ
λμλ
λμθθλε −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +++++=
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[ ]
)exp(
)(
)(2exp
)(2
1)()2( hLL
LL
LLLL
L
LL
LLL
h
L r
KrK
r
qKrz εμλμ
λμλ
λμθθλε −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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(JC)                                   
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)(
)exp(
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2
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h
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(BC)                                      
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
Θ
Θ−+Θ+
Θ+=
L
H
H
H
q
q
)1()(1
)(1
ααθθ
θθ
αδ  
 
 where [ ][ ]iiihiiii Kr )(2exp)exp( λμεμλ +−=Θ ,   for i=L,H. 
 
The first two equations define the two job hiring thresholds (JH´s) as a 
function of labor market tightness. As shown in Appendix A, for plausible 
parameter values, higher tightness implies higher hiring thresholds. In effect, as 
tightness rises, it takes more time to fill a job vacancy and firms will raise the 
minimum levels of productivity at which L-type and H-type workers are hired to 
compensate for the higher wage of applicants. The job creation equation (JC) 
makes the expected cost of filling a vacancy equal to the expected flow of 
benefits. They depend on the skill composition of the unemployed (δ), as the 
vacancy can be filled by either type of worker, and on the hiring thresholds ( hHε  
and hLε ) , as they determine expected surplus during the duration of the match. For 
a given value of δ, it establishes a negative relationship between tightness and the 
hiring thresholds. The intuition for this relationship is simple: the higher the 
hiring thresholds are, the lower the expected value of filled vacancy is. Thus, for 
the marginal job vacancy to be created, tightness needs to be lower. Finally the 
fourth equation – a combination of the Beveridge curves (BC) for each type of 
workers in (1’) and (2’) – implies that the skill composition of the unemployed (δ) 
differs from that of the population (α ) by a term that depends both on relative job 
creation rates and job destruction by skills which, in turn, depend upon tightness, 
the arrival rates of productivity shocks and relative productivities. 
 
4.1. Calibration 
 
In the rest of this section, we perform some numerical simulations of the model in 
order to gain some further insights on the effects of targeted EPL. In view of our 
discussion in section 2, we take the Spanish labor market as a guide for the 
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calibration of the parameters. The period is one quarter and, following Ljungqvist 
(2002) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we set the quarterly interest rate 
r=0.01. The rest of the parameters are chosen to match some stylized of the 
Spanish labor market in 1997 when a major targeted EPL reform was approved. 
Before the reform, firing costs (that in our model refer only to the costs implied 
by dismissal procedures) are set equal to a quarter ´s wage (KL =wL , KH =wH). 15  
 Next, we set the share of L-type workers, α , equal to 0.46 so as to match 
the proportion of  the workforce that was eligible under the 1997 reform, namely, 
individuals aged 16-30 and 45-65, typically without a college degree. Since age 
and education are highly correlated with productivity and, in fact, young and low- 
educated workers are very much overrepresented in the stock of “atypical” 
employment contracts, this seems a reasonable choice as a counterpart of the L-
group. Notice that we implicitly assume that there are no transitions between the 
L and H-groups given the characteristics of the Spanish high-education system.16 
Therefore, the distribution of workers by educational levels is exogenously given 
and the age distribution of the workforce is assumed to be constant across steady 
states. 
Regarding productivity differentials, we aim at matching the wage 
differential between the two groups of workers (computed as the ratio of the mean 
wages of H- type and L-type workers) observed in the pre-reform period, i.e., 1.22 
in 1995.17  In terms of the parameters of the exponential distributions assumed 
above for the productivity levels, this leads to normalizing μL=1 and setting μH 
=0.925. The flow cost of posting a vacancy is set at the average productivity of 
the L-type workers (c =1). Taking into account the existing replacement ratio 
(60%) –identical for all workers- and coverage rate (62.5%) in the pre-reform 
period, the flow utility of being unemployed is set at 37.5% of wages for both 
types of workers. The arrival rates of productivity shocks are chosen to be λL = 
0.0535 and λH = 0.02, namely about 2.5 larger for L-type workers. Given the rest 
of the parameter values, these values of the arrival rates are the ones which allow 
us to match both the aggregate firing rate (3.3%) and the unemployment rates of 
L-type and H-type workers (25.6% and 16.3%, respectively) observed in the data 
for 1997. We use a standard Cobb-Douglas specification m(u, v)=h u0.5 v0.5 for the 
                                                 
15 In Spain there is an advanced notice period and dismissals have to go through a labor court, in 
case of individual dismissals, or through administrative approval, in case of collective dismissals. 
Although the process is quite complex, firing costs equivalent to a quarter’s wages is a good 
guess.  
16 Tuition fees in Spanish public universities are very low (about € 600 per year in 2005). Thus, it 
seems reasonable to assume that some people have the skills to graduate from college at no cost 
while others cannot graduate no matter what their effort is.  
17 The wage data are taken from the Wage Structure Survey. This survey is the unique source of 
data on wages by age and educational attainment in Spain. It is available for 1995 and 2002. The 
rest of the observations in this section are taken from the Spanish Labor Force Survey for 1997. 
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meetings function, with the bargaining power of workers being equal to 0.5.18 
Notice that the combined assumptions of a constant matching elasticity of 0.5 and 
symmetric Nash bargaining is widely used in the literature and receives some 
support in the data (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Finally, the shift 
parameter h is set equal to 4.5 to yield an aggregate exit rate from unemployment 
equal to 12.8%, similar to the one observed in 1997.  The complete list of 
parameter values is reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
 Baseline parameters 
 
Interest rate r = 0.01 
 
Share of L-type workers α = 0.46 
 
Firing costs KL = wL 
KH = wH 
Exponents of productivity 
distribution 
μL = 1 
 μH = 0.925 
 
Flow utility of unemployed zL = 0.375wL 
 zH = 0.375wH 
 
Flow cost vacancies c = 1  
Arrival rates of productivity 
shocks 
λL = 0.0535 
 λH = 0.02 
 
Shift parameter of matching 
function 
h = 4.5 
 
 
 
4.2. Results 
        
Table 2 describes the initial labor market outcomes under the assumption that the 
firing costs are equal to a quarter´s wages. Inspection of the results reveals that 
                                                 
18 In a previous version of this paper we discussed the role of the matching elasticity. The value of 
this parameter is an important determinant of the differences in the steady state distribution with 
segmented and un-segmented markets but the qualitative predictions for the effects of EPL 
reforms are not sensitive to this choice.   
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our baseline calibration replicates almost perfectly with the pre-reform situation in 
Spain. Thus, departing from this initial setup, we procede in the sequel to simulate 
the effects of three different EPL reforms: i) a reduction of firing costs targeted on 
L-type workers (KL= 0,  KH=wH ), ii) a reduction of firing costs targeted on H-
type workers (KL= wL , KH=0), and iii) a proportional reduction of firing costs for 
all workers (KL=τ’wL ,  KH=τ’wH , 0<τ’<1). In the case of the latter reform the 
value of parameter τ´ is set to obtain an identical reduction in firing costs as under 
the first reform. Both reforms are therefore commensurate. The results for these 
three alternative cases are reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 2 
 
 Benchmark calibration 
 
 Model 
 
Data 
 L H Aggregate L H Aggregate 
Labor market tightness θ -- -- 1.44    
Unemployment rates (%) 
 
25.6 16.3 20.6 25.6 16.4 20.6 
Threshold levels 
   Destruction, εd 
         Hiring, εh 
 
 
3.10 
3.60 
 
4.02 
4.31 
 
 
-- 
-- 
   
Exit rate from 
unemployment 
(%) –quarterly 
 
Firing rate (%) –quarterly 
 
 
14.82 
 
 
5.11 
 
10.05 
 
 
1.95 
 
12.78 
 
 
3.31 
  
 
 
12.82 
 
 
3.35 
 
Average productivity 
 
Average wage 
 
Wage differential (H/L) 
 
4.57 
 
3.91 
5.38 
 
4.76 
5.03 
 
4.39 
 
1.218 
   
 
 
 
1.214 
Total firing costs 
 
0.068
3 
0.0420 0.1103    
 
 As shown in the first panel of Table 3, when a targeted reform at L-type 
workers is implemented (KL=0), the reduction in the unemployment rate of the L-
group is rather large (8.1 p.p.) whilst it is lower for the H- group (0.7 p.p.), 
resulting in a fall in the aggregate unemployment rate of 4.1 p.p. The proportion 
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of L-type workers in the unemployment pool falls from 57.3% to 48.7%.19 While 
the firing rate of the H-type workers is not significantly affected by this type of 
reform, exit rates from unemployment for both groups increase, particularly in the 
case of workers in the L-group whose firing costs are now zero. Finally, although 
the average wage hardly changes, the between-group wage inequality increases 
substantially, as reflected by the rise in the ratio between the wages of H-type and 
L-type workers (wH / wL ) from 1.22 to 1.28. Lastly, total firing costs fall from 
0.1103 (about 3.2% of the wage bill) to 0.0424 (about 1.2% of the wage bill). 
 
Table 3 
 
 The effects of targeted and comprehensive EPL reforms (random matching) 
 
 Targeted EPL reforms Comprehensive 
EPL reform 
  
KL=  0, KH=4.76 
 
 
KL=3.91,  KH=0 
 
 
KL=0.3625*3.91 
KH=0.3625*4.76 
 L H Aggregate L H Aggregate L H Aggregate 
Tightness, θ 
 
-- -- 1.90 -- -- 1.63 -- -- 1.86 
Unemployment rates 
(%) 
 
17.5 15.7 16.5 25.1 13.2 18.7 20.1 14.0 16.8 
Threshold levels 
Destruction, εd 
Hiring, εh  
 
 
3.24 
3.24 
 
4.13 
4.41 
 
-- 
-- 
 
3.13 
3.63 
 
4.10 
4.10 
 
 
-- 
-- 
 
3.22 
3.40 
 
 
4.15 
4.25 
 
-- 
-- 
Exit rate from  
unemployment  
(%) –quarterly 
 
Firing rate (%) 
 –quarterly 
 
 
 
24.24 
 
5.14 
 
 
10.49 
 
1.96 
 
 
17.18 
 
3.40 
 
 
 
 
15.24 
 
5.12 
 
 
12.88 
 
1.96 
 
 
14.34 
 
3.29 
 
 
20.40 
 
5.14 
 
 
12.05 
 
1.96 
 
 
16.64 
 
3.36 
Average 
productivity 
 
Average wage 
 
4.24 
 
3.81 
5.49 
 
4.86 
4.92 
 
4.38 
4.61 
 
3.95 
5.19 
 
4.65 
4.94 
 
4.36 
4.40 
 
3.88 
5.33 
 
4.76 
4.92 
 
4.37 
Total firing costs 
 
0 0.0424 0.0424 0.0689 0 0.0689 0.0268 0.0157 0.0424 
 
By way of illustration, it is useful to confront the above-mentioned results 
with the post-reform situation in the Spanish labor market. In 2002, i.e., five years 
after the reform, the corresponding unemployment rates of L-type and H- type 
                                                 
19 These figures are not reported in the Tables since they can be easily computed from the value of 
α and the unemployment rates. The average productivity level has been computed using the 
ergodic distribution of productivity whose derivation can be found in the working paper version of 
this article (see Dolado et al., 2005).  
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workers had fallen to 13.2% and 11.2%, respectively, resulting in an average 
unemployment rate of 11.5%. Similarly, between 1997 and 2002, the wage 
differential (wH / wL ) went up from 1.22 to 1.27. Hence, in line with the 
predictions of our calibrated model, the unemployment differential between L and 
H- type workers narrowed substantially and the reform seems to have induced an 
increase in the between-group wage inequality. Finally, by comparing the 
absolute figures of the predicted and realized unemployment rates, we can 
conclude that a targeted EPL reform can account for roughly one half of the total 
fall in unemployment during this period.  
Hence, the accuracy of our predictions for the 1997 reform suggests that 
our calibrated model provides an adequate framework to evaluate the effects the 
other two above-mentioned EPL reforms. In the second panel of Table 3 we 
report the effects of a targeted  reform that only eliminates the firing costs for H-
type workers (KH=0). In this case, as expected, there is a smaller reduction in the 
unemployment rates for the aggregate (1.9 p.p.) and for L-type workers (0.5 p.p.), 
and a larger one for H-type workers (2.5 p.p.) than under the first reform, relative 
to the pre-reform situation displayed in Table 2. The between-group inequality 
decreases from 1.22 to 1.08, reflecting the higher (lower) wage of L-type (H-type) 
workers after the reform. Total firing costs, in turn, fall from 3.2% of the wage 
bill to 1.9%, implying a smaller reduction than under the first reform.  Thus, for 
each percentage point of a reduction in total firing costs, the fall in aggregate 
unemployment due to EPL reform targeted at L-type workers is much higher 
(about 2.8 times) than under an EPL reform targeted at H-type workers.  
The basic explanation for this last result has to do with the role played by 
the relatively low arrival rate of shocks for H-type workers in the working of the 
matching spillovers. In effect, in each of these reforms, there are two reasons why 
the targeted reduction of firing costs for one group of workers makes more 
profitable the creation of vacancies by firms: i) the reduction in the waste of 
resources when a bad productivity shocks occur and ii) the weaker bargaining 
position of the particular group of workers whose firing costs have been reduced. 
In a single market, as firms create more vacancies, both groups of workers exit 
unemployment at a faster rate. However, the effect is substantially stronger for the 
group whose firing costs are eliminated since the reform eliminates the gap 
between the hiring and firing margin, leading to lower wages. Likewise, for the 
non-targeted group, the exit rate out of unemployment goes up because the 
increase in the meeting rate is only partially offset by the increase in their wages 
resulting from higher labor market tightness. The higher is the workers´ turnover 
of the targeted group, the more will benefit the non-targeted group through the 
spillover effects. Hence, with a much lower arrival rate of productivity shocks to 
H-type workers, a reduction in their firing costs produces a smaller change in 
workers’ flows than in the first reform.  This intuition help to explain our main 
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result in this paper, namely that targeting a reduction of firing costs at workers 
with low and volatile productivity is most effective at cutting aggregate 
unemployment. In unreported simulations, however, we also found that a similar 
result in favor of targeting the firing costs of L-type workers obtains when the 
share of these workers in the population (α) is chosen to be much larger than in 
Table 1, in exchange for more similar arrival rates of shocks. In this case, as 
before, a reduction of firing costs for H-type workers is not so effective in 
reducing the aggregate unemployment rate as a reform targeted at L-type workers 
since the beneficial effects of increased tightness in the labor market spread across 
too many non-targeted workers. 
The previous insight also holds when we last compare the targeted 
reduction of EPL for L-type workers with a comprehensive reform, designed to be 
commensurate in the sense of generating an identical reduction in firing costs. 
This reduction amounts to 36.25% of a quarter’s wages, i.e., τ’ =0.3625.   
The last panel of Table 3 displays the labor market outcomes for this 
reform. A comparison with the first panel of Table 3 shows that a comprehensive 
reform leads to a lower increase in the labor market tightness and a smaller 
reduction in the aggregate unemployment rate (3.8 p.p.) than under the first 
reform (4.1 p.p.). Moreover, both the composition of the pool of unemployment 
(55.0% of L-type workers) and the average wage ratio of wages (81.6%) are 
similar to the pre-reform values (57.3% and 82.2%, respectively).  
In sum, the above results suggest that, in order to achieve the largest fall in 
aggregate unemployment, the Spanish policy makers did well in reducing the 
firing costs of workers with relatively low levels of productivity and high rates of 
job destruction, relative to the other alternative reforms. 
A last issue that deserves some attention is the magnitude of the matching 
spillover effects stemming from targeted EPL reforms. As explained above, these 
reforms stimulate job creation in our benchmark economy because they reduce 
both the deadweight losses from firing costs and the wage of the targeted workers. 
However, given that the matching process is completely random, some of these 
additional jobs may end up in the hands of the group of workers whose firing 
costs are unchanged. To estimate how relevant are these spillover effects, we next 
compute the outcomes of the three reforms for the case of a perfectly segmented 
labor market and compare them to those obtaining in a single market. The results 
for the former case are reported in Table 4, whereas Table B.1 in Appendix B 
presents the choice of the calibrated parameters in the pre-reform situation. 
 A comparison of the results in Table 4 with those in Table 3 suggests that 
the spillover effects are somewhat small in absolute size. Yet, their contribution to 
the reduction in equilibrium unemployment is far from being negligible. For 
example, considering the reform targeted at L-type workers under segmented 
markets, the unemployment rate of L-type and the aggregate unemployment rate 
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fall, respectively, by 6.9 and 3.3 p.p., whilst the corresponding reductions under 
random matching were 8.1 and 4.1 p.p. Thus, in terms of percentage points of 
aggregate unemployment, the spillover effects only accounts for 0.8 p.p. 
However, this contribution represents almost 20% of the 4.1 p.p. reduction in 
unemployment due to the targeted EPL reform. Hence, even though this 
proportion ought to be interpreted as an upper bound on the true magnitude of the 
spillover effects, it leads out to conclude that they should not be neglected in the 
analysis of targeted reforms. 
 
Table 4 
 
   The effects of targeted and comprehensive EPL reforms (segmented markets).   
 
 Targeted reforms Comprehensive reform 
 KL=  0,  KH=4.76  
KL=3.91,  KH=0 
 
KL=0.3625*3.91 
KH=0.3625*4.76 
 L H Aggregate L H Aggregate L H Aggregate 
Tightness, θ 
 
1.83 1.89 1.86 1.10 2.46 1.83 1.50 2.23 1.94 
Unemployment 
rates (%) 
 
18.8 16.4 17.5 25.7 12.5 18.6 21.2 13.7 17.2 
Threshold levels 
Destruction, εLd 
Hiring, εLh  
 
 
3.26 
3.26 
 
4.12 
4.41 
 
-- 
-- 
 
 
3.02 
3.52 
 
4.26 
4.26 
 
 
-- 
-- 
 
3.18 
3.36 
 
4.21 
4.32 
 
-- 
-- 
Exit rate from 
unemployment  
(%) –quarterly 
 
Firing rate (%) –
quarterly 
 
 
 
23.29 
 
5.15 
 
 
10.48 
 
1.96 
 
 
16.83 
 
3.40 
 
 
13.94 
 
5.09 
 
 
13.74 
 
1.96 
 
 
13.87 
 
3.26 
 
 
19.06 
 
5.13 
 
 
12.39 
 
1.96 
 
 
16.18 
 
3.35 
 
Average 
productivity 
 
Average wage 
 
4.26 
 
3.78 
5.48 
 
4.86 
4.93 
 
4.37 
4.50 
 
3.82 
5.34 
 
4.81 
4.99 
 
4.40 
4.36 
 
3.80 
5.40 
 
4.83 
4.95 
 
4.38 
Total firing costs 
 
0 0.0429 0.0429 0.0607 0 0.0607 0.0263 0.0148 0.0421 
 
 
5.   Concluding remarks  
 
A relevant feature of some EPL reforms in several countries is that they are 
targeted at changing the firing costs of some groups of workers facing more 
difficulties in finding jobs, while the firing regulations of prime-age workers are 
left unaffected. Empirical studies trying to estimate the effects of these policies 
have found evidence that targeted EPL reforms affect not only the targeted groups 
but also the other types of workers.  
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In this paper we have presented a simple extension of Mortensen and 
Pissarides’ (1994, 1999) search equilibrium model, with heterogeneous workers 
competing for the same jobs, which helps to understand how the effects of 
targeted EPL reforms differ from comprehensive reforms. We also show that the 
impact of reductions of firing costs on unemployment of different groups of 
workers is qualitatively different depending on which type of workers those 
reductions are targeted upon. In our simulations for the Spanish labor market 
following a major targeted EPL reform in 1997, we found that targeting those 
reductions on low productivity workers and in jobs subject to frequent 
productivity shocks turns out to be most effective in reducing aggregate 
unemployment. Although we have centered our analysis on the reduction of firing 
costs for different types of workers, it is plausible that the effects of other targeted 
employment policies (like targeted reductions of non-wage costs or differentiated 
minimum wages) could vary depending on the structural characteristics of the 
labor market being analyzed.  
There are, however, some limitations in our analysis that should 
highlighted before drawing strong policy implications. We have abstracted in the 
analysis from efficiency and equity considerations. Firing costs may have 
additional positive and negative effects on labor market variables than the ones 
considered here. For instance, firing costs are detrimental to output and 
productivity in a model with productivity growth in which higher turnover 
improves the reallocation of production factors and the adoption of new 
technologies. And, on the contrary, firing costs may improve welfare if workers 
are risk-averse and there are not insurance mechanisms against loosing jobs. 
These issues are in our future research agenda. 
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Appendix A: Some comparative-statics results of the model 
 
 
a) The hiring and the firing rules 
 
Differentiating the (JH) equations yields:  
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which is positive as long as: 
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Thus, a sufficient condition for the hiring thresholds being increasing in 
labor market tightness is that the average productivity is higher that the benefit 
from being unemployed augmented by the discounted value of firing costs to be 
accrued in the future. Notice that this inequality is a requisite for the existence of 
an equilibrium. 
 
b) The job creation condition 
 
Differentiation of the (JC) equation yields: 
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The second term of the right-hand-side in the equation above is likely to 
be positive as  
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for most plausible parameter values. However, if the two types of workers are not 
too dissimilar (in terms of the rate of arrival of productivity shocks, average 
productivity) and the difference of firing costs is not too large, this term is also 
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likely to be small, as both factors would be close to zero (see below for the reason 
why the response of the skill composition of the labor force to labor market 
tightness is also small). Hence, whenever this term can be discarded, the JC 
condition establishes a negative relationship between the hiring thresholds and 
labor market tightness, since 2)(
)('2
θ
θ
q
cq <0. 
 
c) The skill composition of the unemployment pool 
 
From the (BC) equation we get: 
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so that δ will be a decreasing function of θ as long as LH Θ>Θ , a result which 
always holds in our simulations. Moreover, as long as the difference ( LH Θ−Θ ) is 
sufficiently close to unity - which, as mentioned in b), is the case where the two 
types of workers are not too dissimilar (in terms of the rate of arrival of 
productivity shocks and average productivity) and the difference of firing costs is 
not too large- δ will barely change when θ changes, implying that the second-
round effects of δ on θ will be dominated by the first-round effects as the firing 
costs are reduced. 
 
In the simulations presented in the text we have confirmed that the 
conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium heuristically discussed above 
are satisfied. 
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Appendix B: Results under segmented markets 
 
This Appendix reports the results of the calibration exercise presented in Section 
4 under the assumption of segmented markets. They are obtained by solving 
equations (JH) and (JC) in the text after imposing δ=α=1. The corresponding 
parameter values for each group of workers in order to match the pre-reform 
situation (1997) are shown in Table B.1.  
 
 
Table B.1 
 
 Benchmark calibration (segmented markets) 
 
 KL =3.91;  KH =4.76 
 
 L H Aggregate 
Tightness, θ 
 
1.14 1.89 1.45 
Unemployment rates (%) 
 
25.7 16.4 20.8 
Threshold levels 
Destruction, εLd 
Hiring, εLh 
 
 
3.02 
3.52 
 
4.12 
4.41 
 
-- 
-- 
Exit rate unemployment  
(%) –quarterly 
 
Firing rate (%) –quarterly 
 
 
 
13.94 
 
5.09 
 
 
10.48 
 
1.96 
 
 
12.53 
 
3.29 
Average productivity 
 
Average wage 
 
4.50 
 
3.82 
5.48 
 
4.86 
5.06 
 
4.42 
Total firing costs 
 
0.0620 0.0451 0.1071 
 
 
Notes: Steady state values for simulations with the following set of parameter values: 
r=0.01,  c=1, α=0.46, zL=1.4625, zH =1.8, λL = 0.0535, λH = 0.02, μL=1, μH=0.925, h=4.5, 
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